A Dipshit's Excuse for Intelligence
The era of actual DEI hires.
[This blog will always be free to read, but it’s also how I pay my bills. If you have suggestions or feedback on how I can earn your paid subscription, shoot me an email: cmclymer@gmail.com. And if this is too big of a commitment, I’m always thankful for a simple cup of coffee.]
Early this afternoon, Jeffrey Goldberg, editor-in-chief of The Atlantic, revealed he had been inadvertently added to a Signal chat group by Mike Waltz—Trump’s national security advisor—in which senior national security officials in the Trump administration discussed the particulars of an imminent military operation against the Houthis, an antisemitic terrorist organization backed by Iran.
Understandably, Mr. Goldberg was quite confused for a number of valid reasons, and this para in his excellent piece sums it up pretty well:
After receiving the Waltz text related to the “Houthi PC small group,” I consulted a number of colleagues. We discussed the possibility that these texts were part of a disinformation campaign, initiated by either a foreign intelligence service or, more likely, a media-gadfly organization, the sort of group that attempts to place journalists in embarrassing positions, and sometimes succeeds. I had very strong doubts that this text group was real, because I could not believe that the national-security leadership of the United States would communicate on Signal about imminent war plans. I also could not believe that the national security adviser to the president would be so reckless as to include the editor in chief of The Atlantic in such discussions with senior U.S. officials, up to and including the vice president.
Yeah, that’s all pretty reasonable. I would even call it uncommonly wise compared to what passes for common sense in much of D.C. these days.
For those who don’t know, Signal is a free, open-source, encrypted messaging service app, which, for folks who may not be tech-aware, can sound vaguely intimidating, but I promise it’s not.
Anyone can download Signal through the typical app stores on your phone and get set up on it pretty quickly. It’s widely used as the primary messaging app among politicos, journalists, and national security personnel out of an abundance of caution to avoid surveillance by bad actors.
(And given how things are going, I’d recommend everyone use it.)
Anyway, although the messages are encrypted, the standards for sharing classified information still apply—as in: don’t do it on a messaging app, and that includes Signal.
Mr. Goldberg revealed that Pete “It’s Five O’Clock Somewhere” Hegseth, the sitting Secretary of Defense, shared extensive, highly classified information within the text group about the aforementioned military operation, which is pretty chilling in the context of typical operational security. From his article:
At 11:44 a.m., the account labeled “Pete Hegseth” posted in Signal a “TEAM UPDATE.” I will not quote from this update, or from certain other subsequent texts. The information contained in them, if they had been read by an adversary of the United States, could conceivably have been used to harm American military and intelligence personnel, particularly in the broader Middle East, Central Command’s area of responsibility. What I will say, in order to illustrate the shocking recklessness of this Signal conversation, is that the Hegseth post contained operational details of forthcoming strikes on Yemen, including information about targets, weapons the U.S. would be deploying, and attack sequencing.
Okay, let me tell y’all a quick story:
When I was a 20 year-old enlisted soldier, I had a Secret security clearance and got tasked out to a military intelligence facility for a few months with a lot of highly classified information stored in combo-locked file cabinets.
During my time there, I was basically a glorified clerk. I would process all personnel entering the facility, checking their identification against a clearance database, assist in monitoring secure communications, and various other tedious but important duties.
One of my responsibilities, several times during every shift, was to ensure all the classified file cabinets were properly locked, then enter into a log that I had done those checks, and finally: initial the log.
On my first day, it was impressed upon me by the supervising sergeant and the officer-in-charge and the civilian director that I properly check and secure the cabinets and properly log my checks and properly initial the forms.
They were doing their jobs, of course, but they were also looking out for me. They didn't want a 20 year-old kid to make a dumb mistake.
I have no idea what documents were in all these file cabinets, and I had no desire to know. I neither saw nor held classified documents at any point during my assignment.
But my supervisors knew that if a document did go missing or was misplaced and the security log wasn't properly filled out and initialed, I could face serious consequences through an investigation, even if it were established that I had nothing to do with the missing or misplaced classified material.
That was calmly and directly communicated to me, and my supervisors ensured I understood the consequences if I didn’t live up to those standards — again, yes, because operational security (OPSEC) is of the utmost importance but also: they were looking out for me.
There are a range of infractions the military will consider in a generous context, but OPSEC is not one of them. There really isn’t much room for error on this, to say the least.
Our government holds military personnel who aren't yet old enough to drink to the highest standards of operational security, and with classified info, it doesn't matter if you're a kid who makes a careless mistake. There are no freebies when it comes to classified information.
What Pete Hegseth did is probably the worst thing a soldier could do in the eyes of the military short of murdering someone, and even then, I’d probably argue it’s worse because it could easily get others killed.
It’s not just bad. It’s not just really bad. It’s an all-timer OPSEC failure, so inexplicably irresponsible and careless and dangerous, that for those of us who have been in these environments, it’s difficult to articulate the stratospheric degree of fuckup this happens to be.
There are good reasons why classified information is strictly transmitted, conveyed, discussed—whatever—within well-defined parameters. Spies are a real thing. Hacking is a real thing. Mass surveillance by foreign adversaries is a real thing.
As Mr. Goldberg correctly points out in his article, there’s a straightforward protocol on how and where and when to discuss military operations, and it sure as hell isn’t supposed to be through texting apps:
All of these lawyers said that a U.S. official should not establish a Signal thread in the first place. Information about an active operation would presumably fit the law’s definition of “national defense” information. The Signal app is not approved by the government for sharing classified information. The government has its own systems for that purpose. If officials want to discuss military activity, they should go into a specially designed space known as a sensitive compartmented information facility, or SCIF—most Cabinet-level national-security officials have one installed in their home—or communicate only on approved government equipment, the lawyers said. Normally, cellphones are not permitted inside a SCIF, which suggests that as these officials were sharing information about an active military operation, they could have been moving around in public. Had they lost their phones, or had they been stolen, the potential risk to national security would have been severe.
We’re not even a hundred days into this administration, and it’s like they’re trying to be as sloppy and careless as possible.
If Lloyd Austin, Pres. Biden’s Secretary of Defense, had done this, every GOP lawmaker would be calling for his resignation by close-of-business the same day, and they'd probably have it. And they’d be right.
Of course, Mr. Austin would never be in this situation because he’d never even consider sharing the details of classified military operations in a text group.
And sadly, friends, that brings us to my least favorite topic: what in the hell are Democratic leadership doing about this?
Both Mr. Schumer and Mr. Jeffries have already slammed the conduct of Hegseth and called for an investigation and subsequent accountability. They have not demanded his resignation, although there is more than evidence at this point to justify it even without a formal investigation.
The Trump admin has already confirmed the salient details of Mr. Goldberg’s reporting. Those details illustrate actions by Hegseth (and to a lesser extent: everyone else in that text group) that are clearly national security violations of the most serious nature.
This is pretty much open-and-shut as a matter, and had it happened in a Democratic administration, it would be understood that way by all involved, including Democrats.
But per usual, Mr. Schumer just can’t seem to go for the jugular, even at its most justified in circumstances.
He’s apparently looked at the criticism of him over the past two weeks and seen the many calls for him to step down as leader because he’s not fighting back (44,000 signatures on this petition alone) and thought: meh, I’m just gonna keep doing what I’ve been doing.
Every time I think there couldn’t be a worse example of the asymmetrical nature of how Republican leadership fight versus how Democratic leadership fight, yet another thing pops up that proves me wrong.
You wanna know how Speaker Mike Johnson responded to the greatest OPSEC failure by a senior national security leader in recent memory?
When asked if Hegseth and Michael Waltz—Trump’s national security advisor, who mistakenly added Mr. Goldberg to the text chain—should be punished for these obvious national security violations, he said: “No, no, of course not.”
Mr. Johnson pretended like nothing really bad had happened. Just a little goof.
Their leaders deny doing everything wrong, and our leaders hold tepid press conferences and put out tepid press releases that don’t call for the accountability that’s obvious to everyone else: Hegseth’s resignation should be immediate.
It just so happens that Hegseth was confirmed by the Senate to his post exactly two months ago today. That evening, I wrote on social media:
“Hegseth is narcissistic, incompetent, and undisciplined. He will not last more than 18 months as SecDef, and tonight’s tiebreaker vote to confirm him will not age well.”
In retrospect, I was wrong on a few counts. He’s far worse than I predicted, and if something like this doesn’t merit his immediate resignation in the eyes of Democratic leadership, I’m honestly not sure what would.
Welcome to the era of actual DEI hires and its chief poster boy: a dipshit’s excuse for intelligence.
When I tell you that while reading that article I looked like a fish gasping for water, I am not exaggerating. For any vet who’s ever held a security clearance, (or any rational human for that matter) this is astounding in its incompetence and buffoonery. I am still, hours later, aghast.
Hegseth lied and said it never happened and Trump is "playing" dumb, pretending he doesn't know anything about it. I agree that Democrats need to play this whole fiasco on a loop and demand some resignations. People who adhere to morals, ethics and rules would admit to their mistake and resign. Unfortunately, Republicans pull a Trump - lie, deflect and pretend it didn't happen.